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INSURANCE-RATE REGULATION-CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF GUAR-

ANTY BoND AGREEMENT-Plaintiff, an insurance agents' association and
several other insurance companies and associations, instituted an action attacking an order of the State Board of Insurance. The order
approved a guaranty bond form, together with rates and rules, which
had been submitted to ,the Board pursuant to statute1 by the defendant
insurance company.2 The guaranty agreement was an arrangement whereby
defendant guaranteed payment of losses under fire -insurance policies
of other insurers in the event the latter should be unable to pay. Although
the bond form was not restricted to any specific original insurers, it
was contemplated that defendant would use ,the guaranty arrangement in
connection with the policies of its affiliate. Defendant was subject to
regulated fire insurance rates, while its affiliate was not, even though both
were under common management; thus, its affiliate was able to sell fire
insurance at lower rates than those fixed by ,the Board for defendant.3
1 TEX. INS. CODE ANN.,
2 The relevant portion
a TEX. INS. CODE ANN.,

art. 5.13-.24 (1952).
of the bond form is set out in the principal case at 299.
art. 5.26 (1952).
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Plaintiff objected to the guaranty agreement on the ground that it would,
in effect, permit defendant to write fire insurance at unregufated rates.
The lower court agreed and set aside ·the Board's order. On appeal, held,
reversed, one judge dissenting. The guaranty agreement was a true gu~ranty
bond, not a fire insurance policy, and thus was not subject to regulated
raites. International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Dallas Ass'n of Ins. Agents, 351
S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
In a great many courts, at some time or another, there has been
confusion in varying degrees over the use of the words "guaranty,"
"surety" and "reinsurance" when found in a common factual context.
Often, a too-liberal interchange of these words and failure to make a
careful distinction between them have caused the confusion. The Texas
courts, however, seem to have recognized the fundamental •technical
distinctions. In a true guaranty situation, a guarantor promises to
perform, or pay for the nonperformance of, an act which a third party
is contractually bound to perform for the promisee; thus the guarantor's
promise is contingent upon failure of performance by the third party:1
A contract of suretyship is much the same as a guaranty, except that the
surety is joinlJly liable on ·the third party's contract, while the guarantor
is not. 5 Reinsurance, on the other hand, while it may resemble suretyship
and guaranty in practical operation, is often wholly different in legal
effect. In a contract of reinsurance, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify
an original insurer for losses arising under ,the original insurer's policies. 6
T,he event which conditions •the reinsurer's duty to pay is therefore the
same contingency which gives rise to the reinsured's liability to the
original insured. The rights of ·the original insured, however, depend upon
the terms of the contract. If it.he contract is solely between the reinsurer
and ithe original insurer, the origiinal insured has no claim upon the
reinsurer. 7 On tlle other hand, the contract of reinsurance may contain
4 Wood v. Canfield Paper Co., 117 Tex. 399, 5 S.W.2d 748 (1928); National City
Bank v. Taylor, 293 s.w. 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See generally SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP
§ 6 (1950).
5 Arnett v. Simpson, 235 S.W. 982 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Farmers 8: Merchants Nat.
Bank v. Lillard Milling Co., 210 S.W. 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). See generally SIMPSON,
SURETYSHIP §§ 5, 14 (1950).
6 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Associated Employers Lloyds, 250 S.W,2d 477 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952). Accord, Allemannia Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 209 U.S. 326 (1908);
Friend Bros., Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 316 Mass. 639, 56 N.E.2d 6 (1944). See generally
13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 7681 (1943).
7 See Morrow v. Burlington Basket Co., 66 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933);
Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Stein Double Cushion Tire Co., 180 S.W. 1165 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1915). Accord, Taggart v. Keim, 103 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1939) (agreement held not a
guaranty because there was no privity between· reinsurer and reinsured); Greenman v.
- General Reinsurance Corp., 237 App. Div. 648, 262 N.Y. Supp. 569, aff'd without opinion,
262 N.Y. 701, 188 N.E. 128 (1933). See generally 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 7694 (1943);
VANCE, INSURANCE § 207, at 1071 (3d ed. 1951).
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a specific provision binding the reinsurer to pay claims to policyholders
of the original insurer, thus giving to the original insured a right to
prosecute his claim against both. 8 A third type of contract may provide
for a release of the original insurer subject to agreement by the original
insured tha!t he will accept the obligation of the reinsurer in return for
his discharge of the original insurer.9
It is clear that the court properly analyzed the agreement in the
principal case, in technical legal terms, and found it to be a guaranty arrangement. The defendant, as guarantor under the proposed agreement,
was to become liable to the policyholders of its affiliate in the event that
that company should become unable to pay. This was not a contract of reinsurance, because the contract was between defendant and the original
insured, rather than between defendant and its affiliate.1° Although it is
true that certain reinsurance contracts may provide for rights and duties
as between the reinsurer and the original insured,11 the fact that reinsurance
contemplates indemnification of the original insurer against losses under its
policies would seem to deny the existence of such a contract where the
original insurer is not a party. Nor was it a suretyship arrangement, since
defendant was not jointly liable on its affiliate's insurance policies, but
was liable only in the event that a final judgment rendered against its
affiliate was not paid within thirty days. But here the analysis stops, with
the court saying, in effect, that a finding that the agreement is a guaranty
bond necessarily precludes any finding that -the agreement might also be
for fire insurance within the meaning of the statute providing for the
regulation of fire insurance rates. Such a conclusion is not obligatory,
however, especially in light of a general ,trend toward regarding many
surety and guaranty agreements as contracts of insurance. 12 Mortgage
guaranties and fidelity bonds are but two of the various types of agreements which have been held to constitute guaranty insurance.13 And
although guaranty insurance is not fire insurance in form, in this instance
it is nevertheless fire insurance in practical effect. 14
The leading Texas case to consider the relationship between a guaranty,
or suretyship, and an insurance contract, held that a fidelity bond, although
s See VANCE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1071-73.
Id. at 1073-74.
10 See authorities cited notes 6, 7 supra and accompanying text.
11 See Vance, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1071-73, and text accompanying note 8 supra.
12 See 9 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 5273 (1943); 1 COUCH, INSURANCE 644-49 (2d ed. 1959).
1s E.g., Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 285 U.S. 182 (1932); United States v. Home
Title Ins. Co., 285 U.S. 191 (1932); Young v. American Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373, 77
Atl. 623 (1910); Town of Troy v. American Fid. Co., 120 Vt. 410, 143 A.2d 469 (1958).
For an extensive list of cases, see Annots., 119 A.L.R. 1241 (1939); 100 A.L.R. 1449
(1936); 63 A.L.R. 711 (1929).
14 Sec VANCE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 197.
9
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technically a surety arrangement, was in legal effect insurance. 11• A
number of similar decisions have followed,16 apparently guided by the
principle that little, if any, weight should be given to ·the words used to
characterize or classify the contract, and that ,the purpooe and effect of
the agreement should determine its legal consequences.17 In the principal
case, although ·the agreement was termed a "gu.u-anty bond," the actual
effect was to indemnify the original insured for any loss of money
sustained due to default by the original insurer. The real question for
the court, therefore, was whether such a promise to indemnify, when considered from the standpoint of its purpose and effect, was truly conditioned
upon failure to perform by 1.he original insurer, or whether it was actually
contingent only upon a fire loss suffered by insured, so as to make the
agreement subject to ·the regulated fire rates. 18
There were several factors existing in this situation which might
tend to show that the guaranty bond was in purpose and effect a form
of fire insurance. First, and probably most significant, was the condition
precedent ,to defendant's duty to pay. Although liability would attach
if the original insurer, defendant's affiliate, was judicially declared to be
insolvent or was placed in receivership, these conditions seem unimportant
in light of the clause which provided that liability would attach if the
original insurer should otherwise be found "unable to pay." Under the
agreement, the original insurer would be deemed unable to pay if a
final judgment rendered against it was not sa·tisfied within thirty days. 19
It is plain that the original insurer could purposely defer payment for
thkty days, even though perfectly able to pay, and thus bring into
existence defendant's duty to pay.20 The potential of such a scheme is
obvious; it could, in practical effect, operate exactly as a fire insurance
contract, at the whim and discretion of the parties. A second factor is
15
HI

Southern Sur. Co. v. Austin, 17 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
E.g., Ware v. Heath, 237 S.'W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Maryland Cas. Co. v.

Crescent Valley Creamery, 103 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); National Auto Serv.
Corp. v. State, 55 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
17 "In determining whether a contract is one of suretyship or insurance, courts will
consider the substance, rather than the form, of the contract. The fundamental nature
of the contract cannot be changed by the names by which the parties may designate
themselves." Southern Sur. Co. v. Austin, 17 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
18 As was stated in the dissenting opinion, principal case at 306, it seems clear that
the legislature intended to distjnguish between fire insurance and guaranty bonds. The
portion of the Insurance Code which regulates guaranty bonds expressly excludes from
its scope the writing of fire insurance. TEX. INs. CODE ANN., art. 5.13 (1952). This exclusion would also seem to evidence an intent to subject all fire insurance policies to
the scrutiny of the rate regulation provisions, even though they are in the form of
guaranty bonds.
19 See principal case at 299.
20 Indeed, as the dissenting judge stated: "No execution that I know of could be
satisfied within thirty days after final judgment. The liability of [defendant] would
attach before the ordinary execution could be satisfied." Principal case at 305.
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cliat such a guaranty arrangement may act as a powerful inducement, to
insure with the unregulated companies whose performance the agreement
was intended to guarantee. In the principal case, defendant's affiliate was
an unregulated insurer of relatively small financial size. Thus, the fact
that defendant's stronger financial position effectively guaranteed the
obligations of the affiliate company might well encourage individuals to
seek fire protection with the smaller, unregulated company. In addition
to the lower rates offered by the unregulated affiliate, there would be the
added inducement of financial stability and security which the guaranty
of the larger company would provide.21 A third consideration is the
state attitude toward certain so-called contracts of reinsurance. Several
years prior to the principal decision, defendant and other insurance
companies had been reinsuring the policies of unregulated companies.
Included in these contracts, however, was a provision giving the original
insured a direct right of action againt the reinsurer. In response to a
request by ·the State Board of Insurance for an opinion as to the legality
of these agreements, the Attorney General of the State of Texas ruled
that such contracts were illegal where the original insurer was issuing
policies at rates lower than those to which the reinsurer was subject.22
It seems clear that the purpose behind the guaranty bond in -the principal
case was to attempt to achieve the same result by means of little more
than a change in nomenclature. It is difficult to comprehend how, when
a contract entitled "reinsurance" is thought •to be illegal, it may nevertheless be validated by a slight alteration of the merely formal effects of
the contract and by changing the name ,to "guaranty bond." And this
21 Without the guaranty, the prospect of insuring with defendant's affiliate, Fort
Worth Lloyds, would undoubtedly have been less attractive. In regard to certain highly
desirable Federal Housing Authority contracts for which Fort Worth Lloyds was competing, the court said that an "order to meet claimed inadequacies in financial structure
of certain deviators or unregulated companies caused Fort \Vorth Lloyds, an unregulated
company as to fire rates, to secure financial backing of its affiliate, International Service
[defendant], in providing ..• that its commitment on housing projects would be met.''
Principal case at 302. It is perhaps significant to note that at the end of 1957, approximately two years before the disputed application was filed, International Service had
assets of $8,896,000 and surplus available to policyholders of $2,092,000 while Fort Worth
Lloyds had assets of $625,000 and surplus of $452,000. ALFRED M. BEST Co., BEST's INSURANCE GUIDE 119, 322 (1958). At the end of 1960, the assets of International Service were
reported at $13,019,100 with surplus of $3,438,326. NATIONAL UNDERWRITER Co., ARGUS
CASUALTY &: SURETY CHART 36 (1961). In contrast, Fort Worth Lloyds wrote no insurance
during 1960 and had assets of $655,080 and surplus of $637,581. NATIONAL UNDERWRITER
Co., ARGUS FIRE CHART 91 (1961). These data would seem to support the conclusion
that the financial structure of Fort \Vorth Lloyds was not suitable for an underwriting
project of any magnitude, and that the relative afiluence of International Service would
provide a great inducement to insure with its weaker affiliate. On Lloyd's underwriters
in general, see 2 CoucH, INSURANCE §§ 18:8-:10 (2d ed. 1959). Financial failures and
increasing statutory restrictions have caused a virtual extinction of the Lloyd's association activities in the United States.
22 Principal case at 303.
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difficulty is increased by the fact that the reinsurance contracts which were
struck down by the Attorney General gave the original insured a direct
right of action against the reinsurer.23 Although perhaps technically
reinsurance, they were little more than contracts of suretyship-arrangements so like those in the principal case as to admit of no significant
practical distinction. Thus, although the soundness of the legal analysis
which produced •the finding that the arrangement was a guaranty is not
to be questioned, the court failed to consider further the agreement in
light of its purpose and effect. Pevhaps the court felt it should defer to
the findings of the State Board of Insurance which resulted in approval
of the guaranty bond form, 24 and did not feel disposed to probe more
deeply into the practical workings of the agreement in order to expose
an incipient avoidance of insurance rate regulation. But if affiliated
insurance organizations take full advantage of the opportunity afforded
them by this decision, corrective legislation may become necessary.

Robert L. Harmon

See authorities cited notes 7 and 8 supra and accompanying text.
See principal case at 302: "We do not believe that the Board was arbitrary and
capricious in approving the filing • . . ."
23
24

